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Two hypotheses about the determinants of Russian intergovernmental grants are tested 
empirically. According to first hypothesis, federal transfers to regions correlate with recent voting 
behavior of regional electorates. Second hypothesis states that transfers are higher in regions 
with politically powerful governors. We find a strong confirmation for the first hypothesis and no 
evidence for the second for years 1995-1998. This result is robust across specifications. Panel 
data analysis allows us to control for regional fixed effects. However, in years 1999-2001 
election variables show no effect on transfers. It appears that in the nineties transfers were used 
by the incumbent government to enhance its reelection probabilities, while by the end of the 
century this mechanism was no longer in use as the transfer system has become more 
transparent and objective. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
That tactical considerations enter into redistribution is evidenced by numerous studies 
showing strong relations between grants and political factors such as voting patterns, timing of 
elections, geographical location, lobbying activity, etc
1. Empirical studies on Russia showed the 
importance of the political factors on the allocation of intergovernmental grants. Daniel Treisman 
(1996, 1998a and 1998b) found that receipts by regions of federal transfers in 1992-1996 were a 
positive function of anti-incumbent voting, and also of protest actions by the region – sovereignty 
declarations, and strikes. On the contrary, the study by Vladimir Popov (2004) found that during 
1995-2001 net transfers were positively related to the pro-Yeltsin vote and pro-democratic 
results of the parliamentary elections. 
This paper contributes to the discussion of tactical transfers in Russia in that it first, 
analyses panel data and second, uses a comprehensive measure of regional ‘needs’ in 
transfers. Panel data provide more observations and allow us to control for individual-specific 
effects. The existence of substantial regional heterogeneity in Russia suggests that some 
regional-specific characteristics may influence transfer allocation. If correlated with explanatory 
variables, these regional-specific effects might cause bias in interpreting results in previous 
research. To control for regional ‘needs’ in transfers, we use estimates of fiscal capacity and 
fiscal needs by the Russian Ministry of Finance. By using a comprehensive measure of 
normative ‘needs’, we are able to get better estimates of political factors.  
Two hypotheses are tested. First, the electoral hypothesis suggests that federal transfers 
to regions correlate with recent voting behavior of regional electorates. Second, the 
grantsmanship hypothesis advocates the idea that regions with politically powerful governors 
receive transfers above their objective ‘needs’. We find a strong confirmation for the first 
hypothesis and no evidence for the second for years 1995-1998. This result is robust across 
specifications. Panel data analysis allows us to control for regional fixed effects. However, in 
years 1999-2001 election variables show no effect on transfers. Two (not necessarily exclusive) 
explanations are in order. First, with the use of formula-based transfers instead of ad hoc grant 
disbursements and with improvement of the transfer formula itself, politicians could have lost 
opportunities to use transfers for their electoral goals. Second - a political economy explanation 
– suggests that vote-buying behaviour of incumbents may depend on the popularity ratings. 
                                                 
1 For the comparative analysis of the available empirical studies, see Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2005). 
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Incumbents that have a large lead in the polls may be less likely to indulge in manipulations of 
transfers than those that face a close race (Schultz, 1995). 
The paper is organised as follows. First, we briefly discuss the developments in the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia. Second, based on existing theory and the Russian 
political reality, we formulate hypotheses of tactical transfers. Third, a section on empirical 
analysis includes formulation of the methodology, description of data and variables. Next section 
presents results. The last part concludes.  
 
2.   Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Russia 
 
In this section I will briefly discuss the developments in the intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in Russia which were relevant to this paper
2. 
There are three levels of government in Russia: the federal government, the regional 
government and municipalities. Federal transfers are an important revenue source for regional 
governments. Federal transfers account for about 15 percent of the consolidated subnational 
revenues (Lavrov et al, 2001). However, the proportion grows to almost 30 percent, if financial 
aid from extra budgetary sources is included (OECD, 2002). Large regional differences are 
observed,  e.g.  for Moscow federal transfers amounted to 1.4 percent and for Ust-Ordynski 
Buriatski autonomous district – to 86.7 percent (OECD, 2002). 
Intergovernmental transfers can be divided in two general categories: equalization 
transfers, which support regions with small tax capacity and large costs, and other transfers, 
including subventions and mutual settlements, which are mainly unbudgeted, nontransparent 
allocations made during budget execution (See Table 1). 
Table 1. Structure of Federal Transfers in 1995-2001 (percentage of GDP) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Equalization Transfers  0.90 1.23 1.46 1.10 0.93 0.95 1.12
Other Transfers  0.90 1.32 1.09 0.78 0.36 0.40 1.28
Total Transfers  1.81 2.55 2.55 1.89 1.30  1.35 2.40
Source: State Tax Service 
                                                 
2 For a detailed historical overview of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia, see Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 
(2001) and Lavrov et al (2001).  
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Equalization transfers (under the title of Federal Fund for Financial Support of the 
Regions, FFSR) are the dominant form of federal financial aid. In 1994, a new system of 
formula-based transfers was introduced. It had two equalization windows in its formula. The first 
formula window was distributed among regions with budget revenues lower than the country 
average (‘needy’ regions). The second window supported regions where budget revenues were 
insufficient to cover regional expenditures (very ‘needy’ regions) (Gaidar et al, 1996). The 
formula for the second window was based on the “gap-filling” philosophy of the subvention 
system that was used during 1992-1993 and previously in the Soviet Union (Martinez-Vazquez 
and Boex, 2001). The use of actual revenue collections and actual expenditure data did not 
properly measure fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. This was accompanied by many 
adjustments and lobbying activity of the regions during parliamentary discussions of the Federal 
Budget Law. No estimates of potential taxes and expenditure needs were available until 1999. 
With a reform of 1999-2001, estimates of fiscal capacity and fiscal needs have been 
introduced. For the year 2000 estimates of tax potential used country average share of taxes in 
the Gross Regional Product (Ministry of Finance, 2002). Estimates of expenditure need included 
the minimum subsistence level and other indicators to reflect differences in prices of 
governmental services per capita across regions. Researchers agree that by 1999 the 
methodology for distributing equalization transfers has significantly improved and distribution of 
transfers has been done according to the transfer formula (see, for instance, Martinez-Vazquez 
and Boex, 2001).  
In addition to the FFSR transfers, several other types of transfers were used during 
1995-2001. The biggest category of other transfers is “mutual settlements”. Mutual settlements 
formed an umbrella category that included transfers in lieu of financing regional investment 
programs in the federal budget, to compensate regional government for the mandated delivery 
of federal programs, and as emergency aid
3. Other transfers include grants to Moscow for 
performing the role of capital city, Sochi, the northern territories for the delivery of goods, and 
“closed” cities that were part of the military-industrial complex (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 
2001). None of them were allocated based on objective, transparent criteria and depended to a 
greater extent on the informal agreements between the federal center and regions. 
                                                 
3 Morozov, 1998 as cited in Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001. 
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To summarise, the methodology for distributing equalization transfers used until 1999 
had many features of the Soviet-era gap-filling approach. Other transfers of discretionary nature 
played an important role in regional budgets. 
Apart from federal transfers, another important source of regional budgets is shares in 
federal taxes. After the transition period of 1992-1993, reforms implemented in 1994 introduced 
standard rates for sharing tax revenue between the federal government and regional 
governments. However, revenue sharing agreements were not always respected by the regions 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001). In addition, a number of regions enjoyed supplementary 
retention rates that were often agreed by the federal center in the bilateral agreements with 
regions. First two were signed with Tatarstan and Bashkiria. By mid of 1996, 24 of these were 
signed (Treisman, 1999). For instance, Yakutia sent almost no money to the federal budget as a 
result of the agreement of 1992-1993. Moreover, the amount of taxes remitted to the center 
have been changing across years, e.g. Karelia’s share in federal taxes decreased from 95% in 
1994 to 67% in 1995, that of Tatarstan from 84% to 77% (Gaidar et al, 1996). It is likely that the 
changes were a result of political considerations rather than economic necessity. 
Between 1997 and 1998 the federal government became aware of the negative 
consequences of bilateral agreements on the federal budget policy (Martinez-Vazquez and 
Boex, 2001). As the federal center was regaining strength in the relations with regions, by 1999 
it mostly succeeded to bring bilateral agreements in line with the general legislative framework. 
By then the system of revenue sharing was rather well enforced and supplementary retention 
rates were almost eliminated. 
It is important to note that in this paper we do not consider direct federal expenditures in 
regions (e.g. payroll of militia, wages in the federal subsidized sectors, investment projects, 
construction, etc.). These federal budget expenditures are no less important the federal 
transfers, however, these data, especially for the period studied, are unavailable.  
3.   Tactical Grants: Formulating Hypotheses 
 
According to Electoral hypothesis, incumbents believe that transfers help them in re-
election. They can observe results of the past elections, and pursue their strategy with regard to 
transfers that benefit particular group of voters. This may relate to presidential elections as in 
Johnston (1979) and Cingranelli (1983) or to the pork barrel politics of congressmen as in 
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Ferejohn (1974). The prediction from Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) model is that the incumbent 
government purchases votes by investing in regions where it already has high support. The 
intuition here is that supporters are “well known” quantities, and incumbents have relatively 
precise and accurate account of them. 
Electoral hypothesis predicts that federal transfers to regions correlate with recent voting 
behavior of regional electorates. In Russia, electoral hypothesis found supportive evidence. 
Popov’s findings (2004) were consistent with prediction of Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) model: 
transfers increase with the pro-incumbent vote. Interestingly, Treisman in a series of papers 
(1996, 1998a, 1998b, and 1999) found that transfers were higher in the protest regions. The 
measure used to test the electoral hypothesis is the percentage vote in the preceding elections.  
The focus of a Downsian politician, who only cares about winning election in a 
democratic state is voters (Downs, 1957). A different political economy tradition argues that 
political decision-making processes can be “captured” by powerful interest groups, so that the 
regional distribution of public resources would be at least partially determined by political and 
institutional factors (for instance, Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Vazquez and Boex, 2005). The 
idea that sub-national governments may have differential capacity to secure transfers is 
expressed by the grantsmanship hypothesis (Stein, 1981). 
As Shleifer and Treisman (2000) state concerning the Russian case, “in a fluid political 
setting, where the implementation of policies is important and as difficult as their enactment, and 
where enactment relies on agreement among powerful political groups rather than a vote, 
elections are only one of many arenas in which interest groups compete”. In the 90-s regional 
governments gained substantial power in relations with the central government through leverage 
over regional tax-collection offices, representation in parliament and threats of separatism 
(Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). A particular role belongs to governors (regional government 
heads), who often determine regional relations with the federal center (Petrov, 2000a). 1996-
1997 saw regional elections in almost all Russian regions (before in half of the regions 
governors were nominated by the President). 
The prediction of the grantsmanship hypothesis is that regions with powerful (influential) 
governors receive higher transfers. To proxy political power one might look if regional heads 
were democratically elected and have long tenure. As a result of regional elections, governors 
became more independent of the federal center, and probably had a better bargaining position 
with the federal government. Tenure is often used in the literature as a proxy for power (see e.g. 
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Horiuchu, 2003). Political power might also depend on the regional leaders’ degree of access to 
central officials (Treisman, 1999). One mode of access believed to be important is the contact 
with central policymakers that comes with an official visit to the region. We expect regions which 
were visited by Yeltsin during the election campaign of 1996 to get higher transfers.  
Governor’s power might also depend on which political party he is a member. In the 90-s 
the common rule was that communist governors were in opposition to the incumbent pro-
democratic government. During the election campaign of the Parliamentary 1999 elections some 
governors joined the newly found pro-Putin party ‘Bear’, whereas others supported the anti-
incumbent party ‘OVR’, led by Moscow mayor Luzhkov. 
Other indicators of regional power include the extent, to which regional laws and 
regulations violate federal laws; the frequency of public statements by the governor against the 
policies of the center; the bilateral treaty between the region and the center; regional natural 
resource endowments. Regions that violate federal legislation and have bilateral agreements 
with the center are more likely to have a strong bargaining position with the federal center. 
National resources give governors additional bargaining power vis-à-vis the center. 
These indicators are summarized in two indices of political relationships between regions 
and the federal center from Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004). We use indirect measures as 
we were unable to find variables that directly measure regional bargaining power. We think that 
the two composite indices are the best available proxies for the regional power. We discuss the 
construction of the indices in detail in the next Chapter. 
Besides electoral goals, the pattern of transfers might reflect other priorities of central 
policy makers, i.e. to support economic reform, to support particular economic sectors or to 
weaken ethnic tensions. We include a variable for ethnic-territorial conflicts to control for the last 
priority. With ethnic groups comprising approximately 20 per cent of the total population, 
ethnicity has been an in important problem for Russian policy makers (Marsh and Warhola, 
2000). 
Russia has inherited a complicated administrative system
4. Historically, administrative 
units used to have different rights. Regions with republic status used to have more developed 
institutions of self-government along with various tax benefits, compared to regions with 
                                                 
489 administrative regions of Russian Federation include twenty-one republics, forty-nine provinces (‘oblasts’), six 
territories (‘krais’), eleven autonomous districts (‘okrugs’) and two cities, with Moscow and St. Petersburg having the 
latter status.  
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provinces or territory status. Thus, as the grantsmansip model might suggest, the former will be 
more capable of seeking and receiving federal assistance than the latter. Although differences 
were formally abolished by the current legislation, this still might have an effect on transfer 
allocation. Many researchers have documented that 21 ethnic republics were favored in the form 
of larger subsidies, permission to retain a higher share of tax collections, and special decrees 
granting economic benefits (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001; Matheson, 2005). We also 
control for population in the region, as it might be the case that big regions have better 
bargaining positions with the federal center. 
4.   Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1   Data Sources 
Data on total transfers, equalization transfers, other transfers and taxes remitted to the 
center for 1995-2001 come from the State Tax Service (STS). It contains data for all Russian 
regions except the Chechen republic (88 in total). Estimates of tax potential and expenditure 
need are from the Ministry of Finance (Minfin, 2001). Data on presidential elections of 1996 and 
2000 are from the All Russian Central Election Committee (VCIK); data on parliamentary 
elections of 1993, 1995 and 1999 are from the Center for Russian studies at NUPI 
(http://www.nupi.no/russland/elections/Elections_1991_2000.html). Data on governors, visits of 
the Russian president to regions and ethnic-territorial conflicts was collected from various 
publications of the Carnegie Moscow center (http://pubs.carnegie.ru/choice.asp). Two political 
indices of relations between the federal government and regional governors were independently 
constructed by the MFK Renaissance and the Urban Institute (Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 
2004). Data for population are from the Goskomstat (Official Russia’s Statistical Agency). 
4.2   Empirical Methodology and Description of Variables 
To test the hypotheses described in the previous Section, I perform fixed effects 
estimation on the panel data of the following model: 
it i i it it i it v Controls Power Electoral Need Transfer ε γ β α + + + + + = − − ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1  
In addition, I have run cross-section regressions with political variables (and controls) for years 
data were available, 1997-2000. The unit of the analysis is Russian region. For fixed effects 
estimation I have analysed separately two periods: 1995-1998 and 1999-2001. As has been 
  12CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 361 
 
discussed in the Section 2, distribution of transfers clearly shows two distinct patterns in 1995-
1998 and 1999-2001. First, it concerns the dependent variable. In Section 2 we saw that until 
1999 revenue sharing was used by the federal center as an additional instrument of 
redistribution. Standard retention rates were often not respected by regions and supplementary 
retention rates were common at that time. Thus, revenue sharing was subject to political forces 
and should be included in the dependent variable. However, by the end of 90s sharing rates 
were standardized across regions and supplementary retention rates were eliminated. Following 
the fiscal developments, for years 1995-1998 we adjust Transfers with the taxes remitted to the 
federal center. 
Second, the criteria of transfer allocation also have changed significantly. In years 1995-
1998 the common practice was to use transfers as accounting tools to balance regional budgets. 
So, for this period we define variable Need as the difference between estimates of expenditure 
need and tax potential. The expenditure need reflects regional differences in costs and demands 
in public services depending on population structure, climate conditions, and so on. The tax 
potential estimates the regional ability to raise taxes, given the tax base and average tax rates. 
The underlying logic of the ‘need’ criteria is that it takes into account regional ‘need’ in public 
expenditure and then adjusts it with the taxes that can pay for it. We expect α >0 (transfer is a 
positive function of regional ‘needs’). 
By 1999, the practice of filling the fiscal gap was abandoned and distribution of transfers 
has been done according to the transfer formula. This formula includes expenditure need and 
tax potential. So, for years 1999-2001 expenditure need and tax potential are introduced directly 
into the model
5.  
For all years we use the Ministry of Finance estimates of tax potential and expenditure 
need for 2001
6. We assume that measures of tax potential and expenditure need do not change 
from year to year. Estimates of tax potential take into account regional differences in gross 
regional product (or value added), adjusted for the industrial structure (oil and gas industries 
generate more tax revenues than agriculture). Estimates of expenditure need are calculated for 
all major categories of government spending – housing, education, health care, etc, - and 
                                                 
5 For year 1999-2001, we also ran regressions with the Need defined as the difference between expenditure need and 
tax potential, and political variables had similar signs and significance, but the R-squared was lower than in the 
regressions with expenditure need and tax potential. 
6 Official estimates of tax potential only exist since 2000, and estimates of expenditure need – since 1999 (Lavrov et 
al, 2001). 
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include cost of living (subsistence minimum), indices of infrastructure development, demographic 
structure, climate conditions and many others. 
I control for regional ‘need’ as, otherwise, political factors might be overestimated
7. An 
alternative way to control for regional ‘need’ is to use various proxies such as demographic 
structure of population, social infrastructure development, income per capita, etc. For instance, 
this approach is used in Treisman (1996, 1998a and 1998b). In our view, if comprehensive 
normative estimates of ‘need’ are available, it is more efficient to use those than indirect proxies.  
To test Electoral  hypothesis transfers are regressed on the results of past elections. 
Incumbents are assumed to use the most recent available results of elections. The Electoral 
variable in constructed in the standard way as it is done in the literature (see, for instance, 
Castells and Sole-Olle, 2005). Transfers of 1995 are regressed on the data on 1993 
Parliamentary election; transfers of 1996 - on the data on 1995 Parliamentary election, transfers 
of 1997 - on the data from 1996 Presidential election, and so on. In the baseline regression for 
years 1995-1998 I use the percentage vote for the incumbent party Russia’s Choice in 1993, 
percentage vote for the pro-reform Russia’s Choice and Yabloko parties in 1995, and 
percentage vote for Yeltsin in the second round of 1996 Presidential elections. I also ran 
regressions with the percentage vote for the pro-reform Russia’s Choice, Yabloko and another 
incumbent party - Our Home is Russia in 1995, and with percentage vote for Our Home is 
Russia in 1995 only, and got similar results. In the regression for 1999-2001 I use the 
percentage vote for Yeltsin in the second round of 1996 presidential elections (in 1999), 
percentage vote for pro-incumbent party Bear in 1999 parliamentary elections (in 2000), and 
percentage vote for Putin in 2000 presidential elections (in 2001). β >0 is expected, or regions 
which showed high percentage votes for the incumbent are rewarded with higher transfers. 
Power variable is the label for four variables of the political power of the governor 
(Elected Governor dummy, Governor’s Tenure, Governor Participation in Political Parties and 
Region visited by the President) and two indices of relations between the governor and the 
federal center. As we discussed in the previous Section, democratically elected governors with 
long tenure are likely to have strong bargaining position with the federal center and will probably 
receive higher transfers. Elected Governor dummy (1 for elected governor, 0 for appointed 
governor) is only used for years 1995-1998, as by mid-1999 all governors were elected
8. As by 
                                                 
7 For a relevant discussion, see (Johansson and Dahlberg, 2002). 
8 By 1998 only Karachaevo-Cherkessia did not have elected governor. First elections there took place in April 1999 
(Carnegie center, 1999). 
  14CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 361 
 
1998 elections of regional heads have taken place in most of regions, Elected Governor dummy 
might peak up a time trend, so we include year dummies to control for that. Governor’s Tenure 
(Governor’s years in office) is from the previous year to avoid potential endogeneity problem that 
transfers increase governor’s tenure. Governor  Participation in Political Parties include three 
dummies – governor is not a member of a communist party, governor supported pro-Putin party 
‘Bear’ during the elections campaign of 1999, and governor supported anti-incumbent party 
‘OVR’. First variable is used in the regressions of 1997 and 1998, and last two variables are 
used in the 2000 regression. Region visited by the President dummy (1 – if visited, 0 – 
otherwise) stands for the visits by Yeltsin in 1996 and is used in the cross-section regressions of 
1997 and 1998.  
Indices of relationship between the governor and the federal center include Index of 
Tensions in Relations of Governor with the Center and Index of Regional Bargaining Power 
(Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004). The first index measures tensions in relationships 
between the governor and the federal centre in 1997 (higher value means higher tension in 
relationships). It was constructed by the former investment group MFK Renaissance. It 
summarizes information on the frequency of public statements by the governor personally 
against president Yeltsin and against Yeltsin’s policies, the level of political support of the 
governor by the centre during the last regional elections (with the negative sign) and the 
presence (or not) of a bilateral treaty between the region and the centre. 
The second index proxies for the strength of the bargaining power of the region with the 
federal centre in 1996 (higher values mean a stronger bargaining position for the region) 
(Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004). This index was constructed by the Urban institute in 
Moscow. This index is based on the analysis of regional legislation and its violations of the 
federal laws, the federal elections results (pro- or against the center policies), the regional 
natural resource possessions and other relevant information. 
These two indices are only used in the cross-section regressions because of the data 
availability. We include the Index of Tensions in Relations of Governor with the Center in the 
1998 regression, and Index of Regional Bargaining Power in the 1997 regression. We expect 
γ>0, or more powerful governors get higher transfers. 
Controls include administrative division dummies, population and variable ethnic-
territorial conflicts. The latest variable comes from the Carnegie institute. It was constructed 
using information on ethnic-territorial conflicts in the regions in 1996. The lowest value is in the 
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republic of Chechnya meaning the highest ethnic-territorial conflict. We include ethnic-territorial 
conflicts in the cross-section regressions of 1997 and 1998. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables used in Regression Analysis 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
       
Transfers, per capita  616  0.74  1.40  0.00  12.45
Transfers Adjusted for Taxes Remitted, per capita  616  -0.52  3.05  -37.93  16.95
Equalization Transfers, per capita 588  0.51  1.01  0.00  8.07 
Other Transfers, per capita 588  0.26  0.53  -0.01  5.49 
Fiscal Need, per capita  616  -5.10  6.83  -47.43  5.77 
Expenditure Need, per capita  616  2.59  2.55  1.27  18.11
Tax Potential, per capita  616  7.69  7.68  0.95  52.45
Population, thousand  616  1664  1500  18  8793 
Vote for Pro-incumbent Party or Presidential 
Candidate, percentage 
616 41.12 21.70  1.65  79.80
Governor's Tenure  604  3.74  2.63  0  10 
Elected Governor Dummy  440  0.86  0.35  0  1 
Governor's Party Affiliation Dummy  352  0.91  0.28  0  1 
Region Visited by the President, 1996  88  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Governor Supported Pro-Putin Party, 1999  88  0.45  0.50  0  1 
Governor Supported Anti-Government Party, 1999  88  0.16  0.37  0  1 
Index of Tensions in Relations of Governor with the 
Center, 1997 
86 2.14  0.82  1  3 
Index of Regional Bargaining Power, 1996  86  3.31  1.44  1  5 
Ethno-territorial Conflict, 1996  88  94.55 14.13  40  100 
Territory ('Krai') Dummy  88  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Province ('Oblast') Dummy  88  0.57  0.50  0  1 
Autonomous District ('Okrug') Dummy  88  0.11  0.32  0  1 
City Dummy  88  0.02  0.15  0  1 
Note: transfers, taxes and ‘needs’ are in real terms, per capita; here and below the unit is 100 thousand rubles from 
1993, at the exchange rate of 576 rubles per USD dollar. 
All specifications are in real terms
9. The dependent variable, the ‘need’ variable and 
population are in per capita terms. Regressions are performed for total transfers, equalization 
transfers and other transfers as dependant variable. Distinguishing between types of transfers 
allows us to test our hypotheses not only for aggregate flows, but also for particular transfer 
streams. One would expect that political factors are more important in distribution of other 
transfers compared to formula-based equalization transfers. Once controlled for the regional 
needs in a transfer, we want to test what political variables are significant and have expected 
signs according to the Electoral and Grantsmanship hypotheses. 
                                                 
9 End year CPI comes from International Financial Statistics database and the Central Bank of Russia. 
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To control for temporal autocorrelation, I included lagged dependent variable in the 
regressions and performed the procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) on the panel 
data. It turned out that in all specifications lagged dependent variables were insignificant. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to include some political variables in the fixed effects 
estimations that were significant in the literature (see, for instance, Treisman (1999)). Variables 
such as visits of the President to regions, governor participation in political parties are not 
available in the panel. However, we run cross-section regressions with some of those variables.  
 
5.   Results 
 
1995 - 1998 
Results of the fixed effects estimation for the years 1995-1998 are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Regression Results, Dependent Variable Transfers Adjusted, for Years 1995-1998 
1995-1998 Total  Transfers
1 Equalization Transfers Other Transfers 
Fiscal Need  4.065  4.333  4.122 
 [0.457]***  [0.503]***  [0.480]*** 
      
Vote for Pro-incumbent Party   0.017  0.025  0.023 
or Presidential Candidate  [0.009]*  [0.009]***  [0.008]*** 
      
Governor's Tenure  -0.015  0.015  0.009 
 [0.047]  [0.045]  [0.043] 
      
Elected Governor Dummy  -0.147  0.18  0.18 
 [0.240]  [0.241]  [0.230] 
      
Population, million  -6.253  -10.369  -5.19 
 [5.051]  [5.216]**  [4.976] 
      
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 340  327  327 
      
Number of id  88  88  88 
      
R-squared  0.28 0.31 0.34 
Note: 1. All dependent variables are adjusted for taxes remitted. 
           2. Here and below standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients are significant *** - at 1% significance level, 
** - at 5% significance level, and * - at 10% significance level. 
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Three columns correspond to the regression with total transfers, with equalization 
transfers and other transfers as dependent variable (all adjusted for taxes remitted). First thing to 
note is that, as expected, fiscal need is positive and significant across specifications. Second, 
vote for pro-incumbent party or presidential candidate is positive and significant. This implies 
that regions with pro-incumbent votes got higher transfers, above their ‘needs’. The magnitude 
of the effect is substantial. One percent increase in pro-incumbent vote resulted for a region on 
average in 51 thousand rubles of 2000 per capita (0.017*Consumer Price Index’2000) more in 
total transfers
10. For some regions it accounts for a big portion of their total transfer. This result 
goes in line with Popov’s (2004) finding that the federal government awarded its loyal supporters 
with transfers. Third, we find no evidence for the grantsmanship hypothesis: neither governor’s 
tenure, no elected governor dummy turned out to be significant. We further check grantsmanship 
hypothesis with more variables in the cross-section regressions. 
Region’s population is negative and significant in the specification with equalizations 
transfers. Its sign is opposite to the one expected according to the Grantsmanship hypothesis. 
The fact that smaller regions get higher transfers might reflect inefficiencies of the existing 
system of fiscal federalism. Extremely small size of some regions (especially autonomous 
districts, but not only) might lead to excessive financing of some public goods. In Treisman 
(1996) population is also negatively correlated with transfers. An explanation he suggests is 
related to the bargaining power of regions: regions have roughly equal formal access to central 
ministries and officials, regardless of whether they represent a few hundred thousand or a few 
million residents. 
Analysis of cross-section regressions with political variables for 1997 and 1998 confirm 
results of the regression for 1995-1998 (See Table 4)
11. 
                                                 
10 The average total transfer per capita for 2000 amounted to 2056 thousand rubles. 
11 We present here only results for 1997, as results for 1998 except for administrative dummies were similar. 
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Fiscal Need  0.399  0.362  0.332 
[0.029]*** [0.023]*** [0.017]*** 
   
Vote for Pro-incumbent Presidential Candidate  0.051  0.027  0.026 
[0.018]*** [0.014]* [0.011]** 
   
Region Visited by the President  -0.172  -0.005  0.111 
[0.450] [0.359] [0.270] 
   
Governor's Tenure  -0.072  -0.101  -0.081 
[0.092] [0.073] [0.055] 
   
Non-communist Governor Dummy  0.551  0.346  0.489 
[0.631] [0.504] [0.379] 
   
Regional Bargaining Power Index'96  -0.127  0  -0.078 
[0.155] [0.124] [0.093] 
   
Ethno-territorial Conflict  0.029  0.02  0.021 
[0.015]* [0.012]*  [0.009]** 
   
Population, million  -0.288  -0.231  -0.149 
[0.160]* [0.127]* [0.096] 
   
Territory Dummy  0.679  0.567  0.43 
[0.832] [0.664] [0.499] 
Province Dummy  -0.158  -0.118  -0.028 
[0.533] [0.425] [0.320] 
City Dummy  0.168  0.12  -0.134 
[1.491] [1.189] [0.895] 
Autonomous district Dummy  1.106  0.651  -0.773 
[0.737] [0.587]  [0.442]* 
   
Observations 88  88  88 
Adjusted R-squared  0.72  0.78  0.85 
 
First, vote for Yeltsin is positive and significant, even after controlling for region’s fiscal 
need. A one standard deviation increase in the Yeltsin’s vote led to an increase in total per 
capita transfers of 63 percent in 1997. For comparison, a one standard deviation increase in 
fiscal need led to an increase in total per capita transfers of 274 percent. Second, the 
grantsmanship hypothesis is not confirmed. Additional variables for governor’s political power – 
visited by the president, non-communist governor dummy, and two indices of relationship 
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between the federal center and regions are not significant. Treisman (1999) found that visits by 
the president are a significant variable. However, his regressions may suffer from an 
endogeneity problem. Visits of Yeltsin in 1996 cannot probably have caused transfers in the 
same year as transfers are usually decided at the end of the previous year. 
Variable ethno-territorial conflict is significant and positive, implying that regions with 
ethnic conflicts in fact received less in transfers (the lower the value of the variable, the bigger is 
the ethnic conflict). A one standard deviation increase in ethnic conflict led to a decrease in total 
per capita transfers of 41 percent. So, it appears that the federal center was punishing regions 
with ethnic tensions by cutting the financial aid, especially the discretionary grants.  
In 1997 administrative dummies does not turn significant, suggesting that regions 
received transfers irrespective their administrative status. City dummy (with negative sign) and 
autonomous district dummy (with positive sign) are significant in 1998, meaning that two 
Russian cities received less transfers than republics, and autonomous districts received more 
than republics (the omitted category). Negative sign of the city dummy might be driven by the 
fact that in Russia taxes are not always paid in the regions, where output is produced (Popov, 
2004). For instance, Moscow remits to the federal budget substantially more than some resource 
rich regions such as Tiumen. Thus, actual taxes remitted by Moscow to the federal center (which 
adjust the dependent variable) would exceed its objective tax potential. 
Overall, results of cross-section regressions should be taken with caution as in those 
regressions we were not able to control for regional fixed effects. 
1999-2001 
Let us turn to the discussion of the determinants of transfers in years 1999-2001. Table 5 
presents the results of fixed effects estimation for 1999-2001 with total transfers, equalization 
transfers and other transfers as dependent variables. 
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Table 5. Regression Results, Dependent Variable Transfers, for Years 1999-2001 
1999-2001  Total Transfers Equalization Transfers Other Transfers
Expenditure Need  3.515  7.127  -3.477 
 [0.762]***  [0.675]***  [0.642]*** 
      
Tax Potential  -1.714  -2.061  0.217 
 [0.552]***  [0.495]***  [0.471] 
      
Vote for Pro-incumbent Party or   -0.001  -0.004  0.004 
Presidential Candidate  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
      
Governor's Tenure  0.007  -0.036  0.04 
 [0.018]  [0.016]**  [0.015]** 
      
Population, million  8.62  19.706  -10.956 
 [2.444]***  [2.121]***  [2.019]*** 
      
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 264  249  249 
Number of id  88  88  88 
R-squared 0.36  0.74  0.6 
The first result is that all three models explain transfers better than the ones from 1995-
1998. The R-squared goes up, especially for equalization transfers (up to 74 percent), which are 
formula based. This result is consistent with the developments in the Russian transfer system, 
probably reflecting the fact that the distribution of transfers has become more transparent and 
formal.  
Second, expenditure need and tax potential are significant and have expected signs for 
regressions with total transfer and equalization transfer as dependent variable. Interestingly, in 
the regression with other transfers expenditure need enters with the negative sign and tax 
potential is not significant. That is, regions with higher needs were getting in fact less in other 
aid. This might be explained by the discretionary nature of other aid, and may suggest that 
reforms are still needed for transfers which are not part of the FFSR.   
In contrast to the results for electoral variables in the previous years, vote for pro-
incumbent party or presidential candidate is not significant anymore. It is also true for the cross-
section regressions of 1999 and 2000 (See Table 6)
12.  
                                                 
12 We present in the paper only results for 2000, as results for 1999 were similar. 
  21E. Jarocińska, Are Intergovernmental Grants Tactical? The Evidence from Russia 
 
 







Expenditure Need  0.502  0.603  0.137 
[0.045]*** [0.041]*** [0.029]*** 
   
Tax Potential  -0.081  -0.143  -0.058 
[0.013]*** [0.018]*** [0.012]*** 
   
Vote for Pro-incumbent Party or   0.006  0  -0.002 
Presidential Candidate  [0.011]  [0.006]  [0.004] 
   
Governor's Tenure  0.026  0.017  0.01 
[0.029] [0.017] [0.012] 
   
Governor Supported Pro-Putin Party  -0.02  -0.065  0.065 
[0.174] [0.101] [0.071] 
   
Governor Supported Anti-Government 
Party 
0.057 -0.074 -0.067 
[0.235] [0.152] [0.107] 
   
Population, million  0.046  0.079  0.018 
[0.074] [0.046]* [0.032] 
   
Territory Dummy  -0.115  -0.02  0.088 
[0.366] [0.217] [0.153] 
Province Dummy  0.088  0.168  0.16 
[0.212] [0.132] [0.093]* 
City Dummy  0.505  1.086  0.568 
[0.665] [0.427]** [0.301]* 
Autonomous district Dummy  1.148  0.313  0.043 
[0.378]*** [0.241]  [0.170] 
   
Observations 88  81  81 
Adjusted R-squared  0.77  0.9  0.32 
 
The result is also robust to the change in the construction of the electoral variable. In 
addition to the baseline regression for 1999-2001 with variable Vote for pro-incumbent party or 
presidential candidate as defined in the previous section, we also run regressions with Vote 
defined as percentage for Yeltsin in 1996 for all three years, and percentage for Yeltsin in 1996 
(in 1999) together with the results of parliamentary election of 1999 (in 2000 and 2001). Vote for 
pro-incumbent party or presidential candidate in all regressions was insignificant.  
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Thus, we find no evidence for the electoral hypothesis for years 1999-2001. What can 
explain the fact that the incumbent in some years was buying votes with transfers, and in some 
years not? We argue that the first explanation is related to the developments in the Russian 
transfer system. 1995-1998 were characterized by the poor performance of the formula-based 
transfers with discretionary grants accounting for a substantial part of total transfers. Therefore, 
there was a room left for political manipulations and bargaining. By 1999 the transfer system has 
become more transparent and objective, and that created constraints to vote-buying.  
Another explanation might come from the political economy side. Shultz (1995) argues 
that incumbent governments tend to be involved in macroeconomic manipulation when they face 
a close race. This was particularly true for the incumbent government in the Parliamentary 
elections of 1995 and for Yeltsin in the Presidential elections of 1996 elections. The election 
cycle of 1999-2000 is considered to be different in that Putin had a large lead in the polls which 
guaranteed re-election of the incumbent team (Petrov, 2000b).  
Third, governor’s tenure is significant in the regression with equalization transfers 
(negative) and with other aid (positive). This result, however, is not confirmed in the cross-
section regressions of 1999 and 2000. Neither additional variables of governors supporting (or 
not) pro-incumbent party turned out to be significant (See Table 5). The magnitude of the 
governor’s tenure on transfers is also very low. A one standard deviation decrease in the 
Governor’s tenure led to an increase in equalization transfers per capita of only 10 percent in 
2000. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in expenditure need led to an increase 
in equalization transfers per capita of 1800 percent. Thus, from the results we cannot confirm, 
neither reject the grantsmanship hypothesis in 1999-2001. Further analysis is needed for more 




This paper provides evidence that in the second half of the 1990s when distributing 
federal transfers to Russian regions, equity and efficiency considerations were not the only 
considerations and political factors played an important role. In particular, the incumbent 
government used transfers to increase its re-election probabilities. Regions with pro-incumbent 
votes were rewarded with higher transfers which is consistent with the prediction of Cox and 
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McCubbin’s (1986) model. The result is robust to changes in the electoral variable (i.e. which 
parties are considered pro-incumbent). The magnitude of the effect is substantial. One percent 
increase in pro-incumbent vote resulted for a region on average in 51 thousand rubles of 2000 
per capita more in total transfers. For some regions it accounts for a big portion of their total 
transfer. However, in 1999-2001 we did not find any significant effect of votes on transfers. 
Evidence of the effect of the political power of regions on allocation of transfers was particularly 
weak in this period either. Other political proxies of the grantsmanship hypothesis – governor-
related variables and indices of tensions with the federal center – showed no relationship with 
transfers. 
This paper adds to the discussion of optimal design of the system of intergovernmental 
transfers. Our results may suggest that a transparent formula-based transfer system lives little 
room for discretion and political manipulations. On the contrary, grants that do not have 
objective criteria for allocation produce bad incentives for politicians.  
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